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This paper examines the politics of higher education diversity for both African Americans and Latinos, by
investigating how the structure of the bureaucracy affects the relationship between descriptive and substantive
representation. The key theoretical determinants of minority college enrollments are legislative representation,
bureaucratic structure, university-level policies, and restrictions on affirmative action. A hierarchical linear model
of 500+ universities over an 11-year period shows that each of these factors affects minority enrollments.
M
uch of the literature concerning race and
politics focuses on minority representation
in legislative bodies. For some time now,
scholars have studied how minority groups gain legis-
lative seats—often termed descriptive representation—
and whether this increased presence produces shifts
in policy that benefit that particular minority group,
usually referred to as substantive representation
(Hero and Tolbert 1995; Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin
1967; Preuhs 2006). We now have a body of evidence
showing that, in some cases, descriptive representa-
tion translates into increased substantive representa-
tion for racial minorities. Not all studies find this
relationship; however, and there is considerable var-
iance in the strength of the relationship.
The majority of existing literature on this topic
takes one of two forms. Studies either test how
changes in minority representation affect legislation
(Bratton and Haynie 1999; Karnig and Welch 1980;
Lublin 1999), or they test how minority legislative
representation affects policy outcomes (Meier, Stew-
art, and England 1989, Meier and Stewart 1991).
These studies offer considerable insight into minority
representation but are limited in their ability to speak
to how representation affects the actual welfare of the
groups in question. Theoretically, we can begin to
take the next step, moving from asking if there is a
relationship between descriptive and substantive rep-
resentation to asking more nuanced questions about
when, where, how, and, even more interesting, why
these relationships exist in some places but not in
others (Preuhs 2006). This article makes three con-
tributions to the literature: it demonstrates how
bureaucratic structures condition legislative repre-
sentation; it illustrates the representation process
when policies are directly tied to minority interests
as in higher education; and it relies on hierarchical
linear models to estimate appropriate relationships.
State Governments and Minority
Student Enrollments
Higher education policy offers great potential in
advancing our knowledge about minority represen-
tation. Unlike other state policy areas where we have
considerable difficulty in linking a certain policy
good (e.g., health care spending) to a particular
minority group, racial diversity in college student
bodies is a salient issue that one can directly relate to
the interests of minority populations. Since higher
education is controlled, in large part, by state govern-
ments, we have a natural quasi-experiment because
legislative bodies vary considerably in levels of rep-
resentation for both African Americans and Latinos.
Although there is a literature on higher education
diversity, it has not focused on the question of the
political determinants. Most of the scholarly litera-
ture is normative and deals with the benefits of
diversity in higher education so that we know little
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about the factors that affect levels of minority enroll-
ment (‘‘Beyond’’ 2002; Bowen, Bok, and Loury 2000;
Duderstadt 2000; Hurtado and Cade 2001). Even the
existing studies only include a handful of universities,
most of which are elite, Ivy League universities,
concentrated in specific geographic areas (Chapa
and Lazaro 1998; Horn and Flores 2003; Post 1998;
Simmons 1982; Welch and Gruhl 1998). This focus
on elite institutions means we have little knowledge
about what affects the overwhelming majority of
college students in the higher education system.
Critical differences in size, selectivity, and scope have
not been incorporated into much of the research; and,
as a result, the modest research that we have is limited
by its inapplicability to most universities. Before we
can further investigate the effectiveness of various
policies, however, we must first explore the macro-
level factors that shape the environment.
A considerable amount of the popular and schol-
arly attention that touches on the politics of diversity
at American universities has focused on recent Su-
preme Court decisions (Bowen, Bok, and Loury 2000;
Chapa and Lazaro 1998; Duderstadt 2000; Hurtado
and Cade 2001; Horn and Flores 2003; Post 1998:
Simmons 1982). Noticeably absent from these studies
is the consideration of how other institutions affect
these policy outcomes. Other higher education policy
areas, such as budgeting and oversight, consider a
host of possible determinants, with significant focus
placed on the state legislative bodies and its chief
bureaucratic agency (Lowry 2001; McLendon, Heller,
and Young 2005; Payne 2003).
State legislatures play a critical role in the success
of public universities, serving as the primary overseer
in policy, funding, and accountability. The state
legislature determines the level of public funding that
each university will receive, through the specification
of a funding formula and through grant programs,
specific projects, and other avenues. Policies con-
cerning private universities and out-of-state students
are also influenced by the state legislature, and in turn
these policies affect a public university’s ability to
generate its own revenue. Legislatures also can reg-
ulate tuition, set statewide admissions policies, and
advance policies in the K-12 system that will affect
the pipeline of students who eventually feed into
universities.
Because public universities are largely controlled
by the state government, differences among state
legislatures should influence a state’s universities. In
particular, we would expect that a change in the com-
position of the legislature could influence numerous
policy issues in the state. To specify the relationship
between legislative representation and policy out-
comes for minority groups, we turn to the literature
on descriptive and substantive representation.
Descriptive representation refers to when the
demographic composition of the legislative body
mirrors that of the citizenry (Pitkin 1967). In the
case of state legislatures, increases in descriptive
representation would mean a larger proportion of
the legislative seats held by representatives of color. In
the policy process, these representatives—by virtue of
their presence—are ‘‘standing for’’ minority interests,
with the expectation that the increased presence of
minority legislators will result in actions that will be
more favorable toward minority groups. This expect-
ation of policy change is most often linked to theories
of substantive representation or ‘‘acting for’’ minority
groups, where we expect that having more minority
representatives will result in those representatives
being proactive in articulating minority interests.
Theory leads us to expect that, in most situations,
any increase in minority representation will result in
real policy gains for minority groups. The findings of
empirical studies are mixed, however, with some
finding no relationship (Cameron, Epstein, and
O’Halloran 1996; Lublin 1999), others findings strong
relationships (Fraga, Meier, and England 1986; Grose
2006; Meier and Stewart 1991), some pointing to
only ‘‘indirect’’ effects (Hero and Tolbert 1996), and
some identifying contextual factors that mediate this
relationship (Preuhs 2006). Theoretically, descriptive
and substantive representation are almost inextrica-
bly linked, as we assume that minority representatives
will inevitably behave differently than their Anglo
counterparts in advocating for minority interests.
Empirically, however, these concepts are not always
tightly coupled; and so these mixed findings lead us
to ask about why the strength of this relationship
varies and in what situations we would expect this
relationship to be stronger.
One factor that might affect the translation of
descriptive representation into substantive benefits is
how closely policy outcomes are tied to minority
interests. In the K-12 public education systems, a se-
ries of studies (Fraga, Meier, and England 1986; Meier
and Stewart 1991) have found increased minority
representation in the decision-making organization
(the school board) was positively associated with
increased student performance (standardized test
scores, attendance, graduation rates) for minority
student groups. Because higher education policy has
similar outcomes directly linked to minority interests
(as opposed to variables such as welfare expenditures),
one would expect the same relationship between
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descriptive and substantive representation to exist in
higher education.
H1: Increased minority representation in the state
legislature will positively affect levels of minority stu-
dent enrollments at public universities.
Hypothesis 1 allows us to test for the direct effect
of minority representation on policy outcomes. State
legislatures are a key actor in higher education policy
and have several policy instruments that can affect
minority enrollments (e.g., allocating extra money to
minority-serving institutions, funding minority-tar-
geted scholarships, etc.). We also want to consider,
however, ways that elected officials can indirectly
affect policy through the bureaucracy.
The Influence of Structure
To explore the factors that may strengthen or weaken
the relationship between descriptive representation
and minority policy outcomes, we turn to the well-
developed literature on policy implementation and
bureaucratic politics. Most germane to this study is
the work on how certain bureaucratic factors, partic-
ularly structure, can influence how legislative prefer-
ences are translated into policy. Studies have argued
how bureaucracies can be crafted so that the structure
of the institution will institutionalize certain biases
while excluding others (Knight 1992). Much of this
work has focused on the structure of the relationship
between legislative institutions and public agencies,
contending that some structures can increase the
amount of ‘‘control’’ the legislature can exert over
individual institutions (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999;
Huber and Shipan 2002).
Some of the previous work on how variations in
structure and representation affect policy outcomes
focuses on how differences in electoral structures
affect the ways in which minority representation
influences policy outcomes, particularly in the liter-
ature on school boards in the K-12 system (Meier
et al. 2005). Our analysis takes a different approach,
moving the attention from electoral to bureaucratic
structure. We ask how variations in bureaucratic
structure influence the ways that legislative represen-
tation affects policy, by considering how bureaucratic
agencies can function as a filter between legislative
activity and individual public organizations.
Despite the body of knowledge on how bureau-
cratic structures mediate the relationship between
legislatures and public institutions, there have been
few applications to the literature on minority policy
issues. Higher education offers a unique opportunity
to investigate this relationship. Minority access to
higher education is a salient issue that attracts the
efforts of minority legislators. The variable of interest—
bureaucratic structure—can also be investigated in
higher education, because states differ in how the
higher education community is organized, with other
scholars already linking these differences to fluctua-
tions in other types of policies (Knott and Payne
2003; Lowry 2001; McLendon 2003; McLendon,
Heller, and Young 2005).
Each state has a chief bureaucratic agency that
oversees its public, four-year institutions,1 and these
agencies vary in a few basic respects. The explicit
language used to discuss these boards differs some-
what, so for the sake of clarity, we offer some
definitions. First, we refer to the state-level organ-
ization tasked with oversight of the state’s public,
four-year institutions as the chief bureaucratic agency.
We then differentiate between these boards based on
the level of centralization of these boards and their
policymaking power (relative to the legislature, sub-
ordinate campus systems, and individual institu-
tions). The more centralized system is usually called
a consolidated governing board, in which one board
(usually called the state regents) sets policy for all
four-year, public institutions. The less centralized
systems, called either coordinating boards or plan-
ning agencies, oversee multiple boards of regents
which have the actual authority to set policy for
smaller sets of institutions.2 Consolidated governing
boards generally have greater formal authority and
more autonomy in regard to setting policy. In his
study of how structure affects tuition prices, Lowry
(2001) finds that states with coordinating boards,
which exert less control over institutions, have tuition
levels that are more in line with legislative prefer-
ences. More generally, this relationship implies that a
less centralized (and less powerful) agency would be
more likely to implement legislative preferences.
While representation theory would predict that
increases in minority representation should lead to
positive gains for minority students, this assumes that
the path from the legislature to the citizenry is a direct
one. However, each of these states has a state-level
intermediate institution, and if that institution has a
1There is some variation as to which state boards also oversee
community colleges and other institutions, but such institutions
are outside of the scope of this study.
2With only a few states having planning agencies, we will refer to
both coordinating boards and planning agencies as coordinating
boards.
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substantial amount of autonomy and influence,
legislative preferences may be weakened during the
implementation process. This weakening could take
place in a number of ways, whether through the
reallocation of money, the extent to which the
bureaucratic agency chooses to monitor individual
institutions, or the flexibility the chief agency affords
the individual institutions in pursuing various ini-
tiatives. On some level, this could be seen as an issue
of relative power (see Rourke 1969). Coordinating
boards, as more loosely organized institutions, are
relatively easy to penetrate by state legislators who are
interested in pursuing certain goals. Conversely,
governing boards, with higher levels of organization
and control and larger professional staffs, are much
more independent, inertial, and autonomous. In
terms of Rourke’s (1969) theory of bureaucratic
power, they have greater expertise and often have
independent political support that allows them to
resist legislative initiatives. While we would not
expect governing boards to be hostile to legislative
preferences, we expect that governing boards would
interact with representation and weaken the relation-
ship between shifts in minority representation and
policy outcomes.
H2: States with consolidated governing boards will have
a weaker relationship between legislative representation
and minority enrollments.
Other Factors that Affect Policy
In addition to representation and bureaucratic struc-
ture, we know that other political and bureaucratic
factors can greatly influence policy outcomes. In the
case of higher education, we must also control for
changes in the constitutionality of the use of race in
admissions, the vast difference among institutions
within the higher education system, and the effects
of various state-level political and demographic
fluctuations.
Restrictions on Using Race
Most of the attention over minority enrollments has
focused on discussing affirmative action policies, and
the courts have fluctuated on what would be allowed.
The constitutionality of affirmative action programs
over time has depended on the location of the
university, the year, and the nuances of the policy.
The arguments over the appropriateness of including
race in admissions have taken place both in the courts
and in state legislatures, but the outcomes of the
battles have been virtually identical constraints on
institutions. Although the judicial and legislative
constraints will be reviewed separately, in the em-
pirical analysis, they will be combined into one
variable, representing when universities cannot con-
sider race in admissions.
Judicial Interventions
Several judicial rulings—Bakke (Regents 1978), Hop-
wood, and the Michigan cases—each altered a uni-
versity’s ability to include race as a factor in
determining admissions and financial aid. Hopwood,
the 1996 ruling of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals,
restricted all use of race in admissions’ decisions for
public universities in Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas, eliminating those universities’ ability to attract
minority students through race-targeted admissions
policies. Hopwood’s limited jurisdiction meant that
American universities were without a common stand-
ard until 2003, when the Supreme Court ruled again
on the use of race in admissions policies. The
Michigan cases (Grutter and Gratz) lifted the Hop-
wood ban on race but still placed some restrictions on
how a university incorporates race into admissions.
Legislative Policies
Some states also passed laws that precluded the use of
race in admissions, often substituting other policies
that attempted to increase diversity, without giving
preference to certain groups. These state laws were
passed in response to Hopwood, in states that were
not bound under the 5th circuit court. California’s
Proposition 209 and Florida’s ‘‘One Florida’’ policy
restricted institutions in those states from incorpo-
rating race into admissions. This limited many
institutions in their pursuit of diversity, and each
state received considerable criticism. This study will
test the effect of these judicial interventions and state
restrictions on race.
H3: Restricting the use of race in admissions is
negatively associated with levels of minority student
enrollment.
University Characteristics
Some of the more interesting questions about how
state-level factors affect policy outcomes are not
focused on their direct effects, but on how the
relationship between state-level factors and policy
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outcomes is moderated by the bureaucracy (hypoth-
esis two), or in this case, university-specific character-
istics. One substantial difference between universities
is their level of selectivity. Selectivity, a measure of
competitiveness or prestige, affects almost every facet
of a university—type of students, mission, curricu-
lum, faculty, budgets, etc. Not considering how
differences in institutional selectivity play a role in
policy would be to ignore a critical component of the
higher education policy environment. This is why the
existing literature on affirmative action in university
admissions is so limited in generalizability. Only
including Ivy League and flagship universities ignores
the importance of varying levels of selectivity.
Previous research has shown that the institution’s
level of selectivity has a significant moderating effect
on the relationship between race restrictions and
minority enrollments for universities bound under
Hopwood and California’s Proposition 209 (Hicklin
2007). Because the inclusion of race into admissions
is intended to give minority students a more com-
petitive edge in gaining admissions, universities with
open enrollment policies would not see the inclusion
of race as a means to increase minority enrollment. If
everyone who meets the minimum requirement is
already accepted, the value of providing an extra
edge is limited. Alternatively, if a university is very
selective, any advantage is significant. Because most
previous research does not include universities of
varying selectivity, we know little about how these
differences affect outcomes.
H4: The effect of race restrictions on minority student
enrollment depends on the institution’s level of
selectivity.
Other institutional-specific characteristics will be
included in this study as well. Because public uni-
versities compete in a market (though not a free
market) for minority students, some measure of cost
should be included. Only in the last few years,
however, have many states deregulated tuition and
seen significant differences among public universities.
Compared to the differences between public and
private schools, which can exceed $30,000 a year,
differences among public universities are almost
negligible. This may soon change, as state budgets
have not kept up with the increasing costs of
education, and universities have been forced to
generate a greater percentage of their budget through
tuition and fees. To reflect these cost differences, we
include both a measure of tuition and fees and a
measure of the average amount of money a student
receives in financial aid.
Additionally, for us to substantiate that these
fluctuations in policy outcomes can be attributed to
variations in descriptive representation and structure,
we have to control for the competing hypothesis: that
this is all an issue of ideology. Support for minority
groups on various policy issues has consistently been
tied to a more liberal citizenry, and it is important that
our models consider these differences. More impor-
tantly, the inclusion of citizen ideology allows us to
further test our hypothesis about structure. In many
ways, our hypothesis about bureaucratic structure
argues that more autonomous bureaucratic agencies
will weaken the core democratic relationship between
legislative preferences and policy. If the effect of
varying structures is truly found in its ability to
dampen the translation of public will to policy, we
might also expect variations in structure to weaken the
influence of citizen ideology on policy outcomes. To
further test our hypothesis concerning varying struc-
tures, we include an interaction of structure and citizen
ideology. In an effort to control for other differences in
the state’s political environment, we also include party
of the governor and partisanship of the legislature.
Finally, in the case of minority student enroll-
ments, we have to incorporate key differences among
states and institutions that are particularly relevant in
studying issues of race. First, we control for fluctua-
tions in the growth of the minority community in the
state, by including a variable measuring the growth in
African American and Hispanic population.3 Sec-
ondly, we know that some public universities have
identified serving African American students as their
primary mission. Many of these universities date
back into the mid-1800s and now carry the desig-
nation ‘‘historically black colleges and universities’’
(HBCUs). HBCUs are often given special consider-
ation by the state and federal governments through
additional appropriations. These universities also
have a strong reputation in minority communities
that cannot quite be captured in any way other than
with their HBCU status.
Data and Methods
The data for this project have been compiled from
numerous sources. Student enrollment data, tuition
3We have received some questions as to whether structure might
also mediate the relationship between population shifts and
outcomes. We did not find empirical support for this relation-
ship, and we have included a separate analysis with that inter-
action in the the online appendix at http://journalofpolitics.org/.
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data, and HBCU status is drawn from the Depart-
ment of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Edu-
cation Data System (IPEDS) from 1990 to 2001
(IPEDS 2004). University selectivity is based on the
competitiveness measure in Barron’s Profile of Amer-
ican Colleges (Barron’s 2000). State minority legis-
lative representation for African Americans and
Latinos is drawn from the Joint Center for Political
and Economic Studies (2004) and the National
Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials
(NALEO 2004), respectively. Restrictions on includ-
ing race for this study’s time period were collected
from various public media. Party of the governor and
partisanship of the legislature are drawn from Klarner
(2007), ideology from Berry et al. (1998), and the
minority population growth variable is computed
using Census projections.
Units of Analysis
The units of analysis are all American public, four-year
universities from 1990 to 2001. Excluded institutions
include private universities, community colleges, tech-
nical/vocational schools, professional schools, exclu-
sively upper-level schools, and remote campuses.
Because of the hierarchical linear modeling software
used in this analysis, those universities missing data
for any variable in the analysis were dropped from the
dataset for that year. The original dataset included 594
universities for the 11 years (with some exceptions),
resulting in 5,772 data points. The dataset used in
estimation (after dropping those with missing data)
included 4,518 cases.
Dependent Variables
Minority enrollment is operationalized as the percent-
age of first-time, freshman undergraduate students
who are African American and Hispanic, analyzed
separately. The first time freshman variable is used
because it will be more sensitive to changes in policy
and other factors than will total minority enrollment.
The decision to use only African American and
Hispanic students as the measures of minority enroll-
ments is a pragmatic one. Nationally, Native American
students are concentrated in only a few areas, espe-
cially in the case of public university enrollment,
which causes major problems in estimation and
interpretation. Asian Americans, although often con-
sidered a minority group, generally have not been
identified in the higher education policy arena as
‘‘historically disadvantaged.’’ Finally, the use of the
term ‘‘minority’’ can be misleading in universities
where ‘‘minority’’ students make up the majority of
the population, so it is important to note that the term
minority is a term used to describe historically under-
represented groups, without any reference to their
actual numerical status.
Separate models for African American and His-
panic students explore the differences between these
student groups. Practically speaking, universities are
often more focused on raising minority enrollments in
general, but administrators often have separate strat-
egies for attracting African Americans and Hispanics.
Independent Variables
This study considers state-level and university-level
determinants of minority enrollment. Minority legis-
lative representation is the percentage of the state
legislature (both chambers) that is of the same race as
the dependent variable (i.e., African American repre-
sentation used to predict African American student
enrollment).4 State bureaucratic structure is a dummy
variable representing the degree of centralization and
autonomy held by the state’s chief higher education
agency. A ‘‘1’’ represents a more autonomous, central-
ized governing board, and a ‘‘0’’ represents a decen-
tralized coordinating or planning board.
A dummy variable is used to represent the years
when state universities are restricted from using race
in admissions policies, whether from the courts
or the state government (1 5 restricted, 0 5
unrestricted). Selectivity is an ordinal measure, based
on the Barron’s Profile of American Colleges (2001)
measure of competitiveness. The measure is a 6-point
scale, with categories including noncompetitive, less
competitive, competitive, more competitive, highly
competitive, and most competitive, in that order.
Other variables include Berry et al.’s (1998) measure
of citizen ideology score, the party of the governor
and partisanship of the legislature, and the change in
minority population.
Two other control variables are included in these
analyses. Although public universities are bureau-
cratic institutions, they also compete in the market.
Because of this, public universities spend substantial
amounts of time and money to improve their
reputation. In the case of minority enrollments, many
universities have reputations for being receptive to
minority students. In an effort to account for some
of the reputational effect, we added two control
4Latino legislative representation was not available for 1996 so
these numbers were estimated from 1995. With most state
legislatures holding biannual elections, this should not affect
the results.
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variables. First, we include a dummy variable for
those universities designated as a ‘‘historically black
college or university’’ (HBCU). Second, we include a
variable that measures last year’s minority enroll-
ments. Although universities receive new students
each year, the previous enrollment numbers tap into
the universities’ past success in attracting students.
Methodology
Because these data are drawn from two levels of
aggregation (state and university), we used a multi-
level approach (hierarchical linear modeling) to
estimate the models. The structure of the data, with
universities clustered by states, makes OLS an in-
efficient estimator, violates the assumption that
individual errors are independent, and results in
artificially low standard errors. The key hypotheses
in this study also rely on the hierarchical relationships
between states and universities, calling for a multi-
level modeling approach (see Gellman and Hill 2007).
We estimated the random-intercept portion of the
model using all of the state-level determinants.
Additionally, to test for the interactive effects of
(a) restrictions on using race (a state-level factor)
and institutional selectivity (a university-level factor),
(b) representation and bureaucratic structure, and
(c) ideology and bureaucratic structure, we estimated
a random slope model.
Findings
In evaluating our key hypotheses concerning repre-
sentation and bureaucratic structure, we find remark-
able similarity between the two models but a few key
differences (see Table 1). In both models, higher
levels of minority representation in the state legis-
lative have a positive and significant effect on the
enrollment of minority students. However, the main
effect for structure shows that consolidated governing
boards negatively correlate with Hispanic student
enrollments, but do not seem to have an independent
effect on the enrollment of African American students.
The test of hypothesis two can be seen in the
interactive term. In both models, the interaction of
structure and representation yields a significant,
negative coefficient, leading us to conclude that
structure is indeed an important mediating factor
in the relationship between descriptive representation
and substantive policy outcomes. The size of the
coefficients for the main effect for representation and
the representation-structure interaction show that
under consolidated governing boards, the effect of
representation is less than half of what it would be
under coordinating boards. This shows that structure
can be important, and it leads us to believe that
varying institutional structures may even account for
some of the mixed findings in the descriptive/sub-
stantive literature. Had we only examined states with
TABLE 1 Determinants of Minority Student Enrollment
Dependent Variable: Percentage of First Time Freshmen Who Are:
African Americans Hispanics
Minority Legislative Representation 0.084** (0.015) 0.096** (0.011)
Bureaucratic Structure 20.038 (0.144) 20.115** (0.194)
Representation * Structure 20.059** (0.023) 20.055* (0.030)
Restrictions on Race 0.858** (0.269) 1.376** (0.351)
Selectivity 20.041 (0.042) 0.050 (0.032)
Race Restrictions * Selectivity 20.224** (0.074) 20.690** (0.177)
State Citizen Ideology 0.187** (0.062) 0.175** (0.035)
Citizen Ideology * Structure 20.489** (0.080) 20.146** (0.050)
Growth in State’s Minority Population 0.422** (0.152) 20.070 (0.119)
Partisanship of the State Legislature 0.027** (0.005) 20.004* (0.002)
Party of the Governor 0.315** (0.087) 0.139** (0.049)
Tuition 20.022 (0.049) 20.165** (0.048)
Financial Aid 20.033** (0.012) 20.029** (0.005)
HBCU 2.754* (1.560)
Previous Minority Enrollment 1.067** (0.018) 1.266** (0.028)
Intercept 20.756** (0.361) 0.835 (0.256)
N 4517 4518
†p 5 .101 two tailed test, *p , .10 two tailed test, **p, .05 two tailed test
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consolidated governing boards, we would likely have
found modest or even no effect of representation,
whereas in coordinating boards, we see a strong, sig-
nificant effect of representation on policy outcomes.
Our findings concerning structure were also
bolstered by the coefficients concerning citizen ideol-
ogy. Citizen ideology has a direct impact on minority
enrollment levels, but in states with governing boards,
this impact is reduced to almost 0 for Hispanics and
even reversed for African Americans. Again, this out-
come adds support to the hypothesis that more
autonomous bureaucratic agencies can dampen the
translation of political will into policy outcomes.
Our test for the effect of the Hopwood decision
confirmed preliminary results from previous studies.
The main effect of Hopwood is actually positive and
significant, and it is not until we consider the
interaction between the Hopwood restriction and
the institution’s level of selectivity that we can see
the effect of abolishing affirmative action. The com-
bination of the positive main effect and negative
interaction means that the less selective institutions
actually gained minority students when the most
selective institutions lost students. Hopwood did not
result in a net loss of minority students in those
states, but instead produced a ‘‘cascading’’ effect,
where minority students began to filter into less-
selective institutions.
Unlike our variables of interest, which performed
relatively consistently across minority groups and in
the predicted direction, our control variables pro-
duced mixed results, with the exception of the party
of governor, which was positive and significant for
both groups. The partisanship of the legislature was
significant for both minority groups but in different
directions. The coefficients for our financial variables
were also mixed, as tuition mattered for Hispanics
but not African Americans and financial aid was
negatively related to both minority groups. As noted
above, this may simply indicate that financial aid has
not kept pace with tuition costs. Surprisingly, the
growth in the minority population mattered for
African Americans but not for Hispanics, but this
likely reflects the very young age distribution of the
Hispanic population.
Substantive Implications
Although our primary interest in looking at structure
started from a theoretical curiosity in the diversity of
findings concerning descriptive representation, we
would be remiss to overlook the substantive impor-
tance of these findings. In examining the effect of
minority legislative representation and bureaucratic
structure, the findings indicate that the structure of
the bureaucracy affects the ability of minority repre-
sentatives to influence enrollment levels for minority
students. In fact, it is in the interactive term where we
see the importance of the structure variable. Not only
do we see that the interactive term is significant, but
it adds to the negative effect of governing boards on
student enrollments. These coefficients seem some-
what small, but the coefficient for the variable for the
previous year’s minority enrollment shows that these
institutions are autoregressive, where changes in one
year affect future years. This means that we have to
consider not only the effect of a variable in one year,
but its cumulative effect over a number of years.
This can best be illustrated graphically. Figure 1
depicts a state over 10 years.5 At the beginning of the
time period, African Americans and Hispanics each
represent 5% of the state legislature, and every other
year pick up another 3%, so that 10 years later, each
minority group accounts for 20% of the legislature.
Figure 1 uses the coefficients for representation,
structure, their interaction, and the lagged dependent
variable to show how these fluctuations in represen-
tation and structure can affect enrollments.
The graph includes four lines: black representa-
tion with a coordinating board, black representation
with a governing board, Hispanic representation with
a coordinating board, and Hispanic representation
with a governing board. Each start out near zero, but
over time these lines diverge considerably, with the
FIGURE 1 Effects of Race and Structure over
Time
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two lines for coordinating boards showing remark-
able growth compared to governing boards. In the
African American model, the difference between a
coordinating board and a governing board is 10%,
and for Hispanics, this difference is 27%. Even
though these differences take a substantial time to
emerge, few policy makers and administrators would
consider these changes to be negligible, as there are
very few other factors that have been identified as
having that much influence on enrollments.
Conclusions
This study uses higher education policy to probe the
relationship between minority representation and
public policy outcomes and has implications for
several theoretically important questions. First, insti-
tutional differences, especially among bureaucratic
institutions, can affect the relationship between legis-
lative representatives and their constituents. As such
this study provides a linkage between the literatures on
bureaucracy and policy implementation and the liter-
ature on minority representation. The findings suggest
that a more complete understanding of representation
requires theoretical work and empirical studies that
incorporate implementation structures as well as
political forces.
Second, the study illustrates the value of using
policy indicators that are directly tied to minority
interests. Unlike heath care or welfare expenditures,
higher education enrollments are clearly a minority
goal. A rational representative is likely to focus more
effort on such direct policies, and the representation
linkages should be stronger there. That these findings
hold even with controls for partisanship reinforce
their direct linkage to minority interests.
Third, the principal-agent relationships between
politicians and bureaucrats are incredibly complex in
this area. Not only does structure mediate the impact,
but there are numerous agents including board
members, university presidents, and university fac-
ulty who play a role in this policy area. Governance of
higher education is a highly complex process and that
complexity makes it fertile ground for additional
studies of the interface between bureaucrats and
politicians.
Fourth, despite the broad brush similarities for
African Americans and Hispanics in this study, there
were differences between the two groups. We should
expect such differences given the different political
histories, different policy agendas, and different lev-
els of political mobilization. Adequate theories of
minority politics need to bring theoretical understand-
ing to these differences so that systematic analysis
can determine the general findings applicable to all
groups and the specific findings that are unique to an
individual group.
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